Introduction
It is disappointing, though perhaps not surprising, that the use of complex econometric methods should lead to such diametrically different answers to the question of the effectiveness of aid to developing countries as those published by, for example, Mosley et al. (1987 Mosley et al. ( , 1990 , Newlyn (1990) , Levy (1988) and Papanek (1972) . The views expressed in an even more extensive literature that relies less or not at all on formal econometric methods are equally if not more disparate: see, for example, Bauer (1971 Bauer ( , 1984 , Cassen (1986) , Riddell (1987) , Griffin and Enos (1970) , Hayter (1971 ), World Bank (1985 , OECD (1990) . The question is undoubtedly an important one. Official development assistance (ODA), i.e. aid, is now (1991) running at $55-4 billion net a year, having declined through die last decade by some 2% a year in real terms. The developing countries say that it is much too small, falling short of the agreed target by more than one-half. But the developed countries profess to have become very sceptical about the effectiveness of aid, notwithstanding the fact that it is they who largely determine to whom aid is given and for what purposes it is used.
The Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries was convened in Paris in die autumn of 1990 and diese issues were addressed. Regrettably, however, die differences were not fully resolved. This event coincided with the publication of the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1990) in which a strong case was made for greater emphasis on die human dimensions of development. The prospect we foresee is that aid will be increasingly devoted to human and institutional development and technical assistance, at die expense of productive activity. It is expected diat die remaining capital requirements would come from domestic and foreign investors as a result of newly 'unleashed market forces'.
It dius seems diat die aid target (established at 0-7% of die GNP of die developed countries) is, in effect, being rationalised at a lower level (presendy 0-32%), consonant widi diis newly denned, more restricted, role for ODA (International Herald Tribune, 1991) . Moreover, members of die Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of die OECD stated recently that they would 'review with particularly close attention the trends in development assistance over the coming years in the context of strong competing financial demands arising from new global challenges' and stressed at die same time that 'in view of the scarcity of resources, developing countries' own development efforts, including structural adjustment efforts, should be an important consideration in die provision of aid'. The DAC also made it clear that these efforts on die part of developing countries to which aid will be linked will include promotion of private enterprise and the market system, democratisation and individual rights, population control and environmental sustainability (OECD, 1990) .
These developments pose new dilemmas for aid policy. For example, it is improbable, notwithstanding the unleashing of market forces, that there would be substantial inflows of foreign investment, in die decade ahead, into a large number of developing countries, given dieir physical condition and competing demands from more attractive and resourceful locations. At die same time, aid disproportionately devoted to human development, etc., is not likely, odier tilings being the same, to create sustainable material development, upon which die capacity to maintain human development targets will ultimately depend.
Comparative statistics on GNP, aid and savings growth
We have denned as aid-favoured countries only diose countries diat meet the criteria of both high aid growth and high aid/GNP ratios. This removed some of die definitional ambiguity in the literature. 1 The countries identified should, as a group, be of particular interest in considering die question of the effectiveness of aid. The period covered is from 1969 (the concept of aid as Official Development Assistance (ODA) having been introduced in 1968) to 1987.
2 Thus die entire period for which consistent and comparable data are available is covered. All variables used were deflated to real terms. Definitions and methods of estimation are given in die Appendix.
Of die 103 countries for which both sets of information were available only 14 countries fell into this category, as shown in Table 1 . For diese countries, bodi aid growtii and die aid/GNP ratio were greater dian 6-7% which was the average of die latter for die 103 countries (average aid growdi being 6-4%). This single direshold avoided die inclusion of countries for which die values for one or die odier variable were low (i.e. below die average).
All of die 14 top aid recipients isolated by diis mediod are least developed countries, a category defined by die United Nations diat comprises 42 countries. All but two are sub-Saharan African countries. They fell broadly into two groups. Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Somalia and Mozambique, diat are extraordinarily aid-favoured; and Mauritania, Mali, Lesodio, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Tanzania, Togo, Bangladesh, Haiti and Ediiopia, diat are of particular interest because the aid diey received was roughly at a similar level-between about 8 to 13% for bodi die aid/GNP ratio and aid growtii.
In only one case (Mozambique) was aid accompanied by negative GNP growth. This is not surprising given the state of war and civil disturbance in diat country. However, six countries (Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Tanzania, Togo, Haiti and Ediiopia) had GNP Table 1 . Aid-favoured less developed countries: GNP, aid and savings parameters (1969-1987) " 1970-1987. growth significantly below the average of 3-2% for the group of 42 least developed countries for the period under study; and another three countries (Somalia, Burundi, Bangladesh) come just about or below the average (see Table 1 ). Only four countries experienced GNP growth well above the average (Cape Verde, Mali, Lesotho, Burkina Faso). The picture looks especially disturbing in respect of the crucial variable, domestic savings. To the extent that the ultimate economic rationale for foreign aid is to enhance the growth of domestic savings and thereby to lay the basis for self-sustaining growth, we felt uncomfortable with the statistical evidence presented in this table. Column 5 shows that 9 of the 11 aid-favoured countries for which information is available had negative savings growth over a period of nearly two decades. In only two cases (Guinea Bissau and Burundi) was savings growth positive, but in both of them absolute savings were negative. This is not surprising since, as Table 1 , column 6 shows, several of these countries-notwithstanding the fact that per capita aid reached J26-8 in 1988-actually suffered a reduction in their per capita income over the past two decades, while most of them secured increases of less than 83-00 per head a year. Given the already very low levels of income, such increases provide little or no capacity for enhancing savings. Moreover, the increase in debt servicing-which reached 88-5 per capita for these countries in 1988-would have further reduced that capacity.
Shortcomings of econometric experiments
It is tempting to take these basic statistics further by applying formal econometric methods. We have actually yielded to that temptation out of experimental curiosity, especially in view of the remarks made earlier on the discordance of the results of studies of this kind. The procedures and detailed results are given in the Appendix.
1 Crosssectionally (using the exponential growth rates of the variables between 1969 and 1987) the estimated relationship was of poor explanatory power, none of the independent variables (savings, aid investment and export growth rates) being positively influential in respect of GNP growth. The time-series (based on annual percentage change in the variables for each country) also indicated that the relationship was of very poor explanatory power for all countries. Introducing a demographic variable (economically active population) raised the R 2 to some extent but they were still very low, while the regressor coefficient was positive in some cases and negative in others.
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The results of these experiments neither confirm nor negate the findings of other studies on the effectiveness of aid. Rather, the alluring precision of the results of experiments of this kind underscores the obligation that rests on researchers and policy-makers to be particularly cautious about their interpretation and use. To begin with, those with practical experience of least developed countries are very sceptical of the accuracy and consistency of most of the economic statistical series, let alone of those of such variables as annual changes in literacy and the economically active population. Apart from the inadequacy of statistical services in those countries, observers point to definitional and measurement complications that some of them believe introduce variable differences that may be as high as 50% of the 'true' figures. However, these statistics, despite their notorious unreliability, continue to be legitimised by publication and use by governments and international organisations.
In respect of aid, it is obviously not satisfactory to use the kind of consolidated figures that are presently available. For example, there are many different types of aid with as many different purposes, e.g. balance of payments support, project aid, food aid, technical assistance, human development aid. Some types of aid, welcome though they may be, may not have a significant effect on GNP growth, or may produce perceptible results only in the very long run. For example, it was recently reported that for the United States (the largest aid donor), only about 8% of its aid programme in 1986 could be identified as 'development assistance' to low income countries (World Bank, 1990 ). Another example is technical assistance which has not only reached high levels (and even higher in sub-Saharan Africa), but a significant proportion of it never reaches the 'recipient' country. In principle, the basis for including or excluding any of the various components of aid is not well established (Cassen, 1986 )-though, in fact, such differentiation is not yet a feature of econometric models of aid effectiveness.
Furthermore, development is a complex process affected by government policies, institutional and private behaviour, the internal and external environment, physical and human factors, among others. These policies, factors and circumstances vary among countries. Thus, not only are there no pre-determined norms for the aid-growth 1 As mentioned earlier, all variables used were deflated to real terms. The studies of Mosley et al., and Levy measure the aid, savings and investment variables as a proportion of national income in the recipient country OVCT a period of one year. While thii technique avoids deflation, the meaning of the results of an equation in which some of the variables are defined as ratios is not at once easy to grasp in terms of policy-action, and is further complicated when combined with other variables (exports, literacy) measured as straightforward percentage annual rates of growth. We also did not follow Mosley a al., in introducing lagging processes involving cross-country assumptions of very doubtful reliability. Nevertheless, the results of experiments with such lagged processes arc given in the Appendix. 2 The definition of 'economically active population' and the source of information are provided in the Appendix. However, it must be said that an inspection of individual countries' annual percentage growth in this variable casts doubt on the plausibility of some of the published statistics. relationship but the correlation between them may be overwhelmed by the effect of other influences.
In general, therefore, it seems unlikely that the use of econometric methods alone, however complex they may be, would yield conclusions of satisfactory reliability. But the shortcomings of these methods should equally not be a defence against the concern, reinforced by other methods and particularly by direct experience, that relatively large doses of aid do not seem, in many countries, to be providing the basis for self-sustaining economic growth. Indeed, the shortcomings of the econometric exercises mentioned above are themselves useful in pointing to specific areas of enquiry about the effectiveness of aid and to improvements needed in the collection and processing of socio-economic data.
Constraints to the growth of income
In accounting for the apparently poor performance of aid so far as GNP growth is concerned, attention turns to the foreign exchange constraint, the rate of return on investment and the growth of labour productivity. As regards the foreign exchange constraint, Table 2 shows that all the aid-favoured developing countries suffered a substantial deterioration in their terms of trade over the period as a whole, while the fall that took place in the 1980s was particularly drastic. Typically, the deterioration was of the order of 50%.
While there was some increase in the volume of exports, this was in most cases insufficient to raise import purchasing power appreciably. Taking the period average, as given in Table 3 , the increase was much less than the growth of population in all but one country, and usually less than 1 -0% a year. While limited or declining import purchasing power was a severely binding constraint on development over the whole period, it should be borne in mind that the greater portion of the deficits on current account, financed by external borrowing, was accumulated in the 1970s, rather than in the 1980s, as a result of the steep rises in the price of petroleum and other commodities.
The rate of return on investment, calculated as the incremental output-capital ratio (IOCR) for the economy as a whole, provides a revealing insight in accounting for aid ineffectiveness, inasmuch as investment is a, if not the, principal source of the growth of income. What is particularly disturbing about the IOCRs shown in Table 4 is not only that diey are extremely low, even by the standards of developing countries, but that they are mostly less than 100 and sometimes even negative.
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In some studies, aid itself has been singled out as a constraint to growth, in the sense that it is claimed it 'crowded out' private sector investment (Mosley et al., 1990) . However, in the least developed countries aid for production has been averaging about 23% of official development finance; social, administrative and economic infrastructure 42%; and technical co-operation 20%, with multisector aid, programme assistance, debt reorganisation, food aid and emergency aid accounting for the remaining 15% (UNCTAD secretariat, 1990) . Given this structure of aid in aid-favoured countries, it seems improbable that aid could have crowded out private sector investment. On the contrary, the structure of aid, with its heavy emphasis on social, administrative and economic infrastructure, and technical co-operation, would argue strongly in favour of an effect that might have been expeaed to encourage the flow of private domestic and foreign investment. This of course failed to materialise, for a variety of obvious reasons having little to do with the inhibiting effect of aid, such as the absence of economic, political and social conditions sufficiently attractive to private investment. 1 The measure used for the IOCR is:
Where GDP is gross domestic product; GDI gross domestic investment; dY is change in income and dK is change in the capital stock. Values for K are not available for developing countries. We chose this measure also because the standard representation of the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) {GDI,-t l GDP,-GDP,_,) yields a mathematical result, given frequently negative year-to-year changes for the denominator, that makes no economic sense. For the normal developing country, the value for the IOCR used above tends to be in the vicinity of 1 -0. As regards the impact itself of foreign investment, some scepticism would be in order about the practical significance that some attach to its 'positive and significant correlations' with aid (Levy, 1988) . In all aid-favoured least developed countries but one (Somalia), foreign private investment has been minute (the mean being well below 0-1 of 1 0% of GNP) and its rate of growth negative (a mean of -1 -8%), while it has also been extremely unstable.
Similar tendencies to those observed with respect to the rate of return on investment are revealed by the growth in labour productivity, measured as the average annual percentage change in output per economically active person for the economy as a whole. Invariably it is very low, as Table 5 shows, even by the standards of developing countries, generally averaging less than 200% a year. We were struck by the fact that, while inter-country productivity growth rates were rather similar, year-to-year differences within the same country were quite large. Given that there would have been little or no change in the quality of labour and technology, these differences would be due mainly to differences in output caused by internal factors such as variations in the supply of water and other input materials, including replacement parts, and in capacity utilisation, and/or external conditions such as variations in the growth, source and structure of demand.
The preceding statistical evidence points the way to three new directions for aid policy. First, since output growth in traditional industries (export and domestic) has been lagging, rehabilitation opportunities should be available and exploitable without the use of much additional capital. Second, since it has not been possible over the last 25 years to make any dent in the population growth rate, greater attention might be directed to getting absolute GNP increased (thought not necessarily abandoning measures to reduce fertility) as a means of raising the growth of per capita income. Third, the long period of negative savings growth these countries have been experiencing suggests that the sooner absolute GNP growth is increased the better, since it could help to accelerate reversal of the negative savings pattern and also speed up the reduction of fertility itself. A short-to-medium term strategic reorientation to the structure of aid, as distinct from its quantity and 'quality', is implied.
Suggested shifts in aid policy orientation
There would probably be general agreement that, in a large class of developing countries, particularly among the least developed, the effectiveness of aid could and should be improved. Nevertheless, insofar as one may pinpoint the future priorities of the international community in respect of aid policy, within the impressive inventories of policies and measures that have been drawn up (United Nations, 1990; World Bank, 1990) , they are: (1) improved 'quality' of aid (that is, in terms of concessionality, timeliness and adjustment requirements, etc.); (2) enhanced institution building, human resource development and technical assistance better tailored to country needs; and (3) improved coordination of multilateral and bilateral aid.
These aid policies and measures may all be desirable and helpful but they do not focus directly on what we consider to be the essential contemporary problem of aid to the least developed countries. That is, how to ensure mat aid sets in motion, as soon as possible, a process of self-sustaining growth, especially at a time when the international community itself acknowledges that the desired increases in the volume of aid and foreign investment are unlikely to be forthcoming? We shall discuss below certain shifts in the orientation of international aid policy aimed at getting the least developed (and perhaps other developing) countries out of the dilemma in which they presently find themselves.
Population growth, income level and food security
For the aid-favoured group of countries identified in Table 1 there was virtually no change over the last 25 years in fertility rates, while mortality rates were reduced by an average of 0-7%. Acceleration in the growth of population has thus meant foregoing a substantial increase in per capita income and domestic savings. These tendencies, heightened by concern in the North about environmental degradation and illegal northward migration, have prompted a return to crude theories that 'population control' is 'the greatest single obstacle' to economic growth (World Bank, 1989; OECD, 1990; McNamara, 1990) . And, while population control in Africa is often recognised, in principle, as a many-sided problem, in practice, recommendations all too frequently focus on the availability of family planning facilities, health services and education. The near-panic that now grips the North in respect of African population growth might be tempered, however, by the lessons of historical experience and by the results of more finely disaggregated research, especially in regions like Asia and Latin America where fertility rates have declined substantially.
On the whole, while there seems to be no consistent relationship between GNP growth and population growth, fertility rates do seem to be quite strong correlated with per capita income levels and with food security, in broad critical ranges. For example, with respect to the former, most of the least developed countries (per capita GNP [1988 dollars] <8350) have fertility rates averaging 6-5, whereas lower middle-income countries in all regions (per capita GNP >8700 <2,100) have fertility rates averaging 4-5, the deviation around these averages being relatively small. With respect to food security, most of the least developed countries have a per capita daily calorie supply (1986) averaging about 2200 while lower middle-income countries have an average daily calorie supply 20% higher, i.e. about 2500, the deviation around these averages again being relatively small.
It would seem that at the very low levels of per capita income and food consumption that characterise the least developed countries, the marginal family cost/benefit ratio of reduced fertility may be too small, possibly even negative, to be an effective discipline/ incentive for sustained birth control. However, at about double their present per capita income and with the removal of the food deficit the incentive seems to be much stronger. Fertility shows a steep decline, given the availability of family planning services and the opportunity for education. For those interested in formal econometric relationships, our experiments with cross-country data indicated that a simultaneous increase of 100% in GNP per capita with a 20% increase in per capita calorie supply is associated with a 32% reduction in the fertility rate, the former two variables alone accounting for some 70% of the variation in the fertility rate.
Population growth in sub-Saharan Africa has also sparked off much pessimism about this region's food production potential (McNamara, 1990) . But, even without bringing into the analysis the possible effect of other factors of production, the land/population ratio, when looked at in a comparative and disaggregated manner, is not quite so overwhelming, indeed even encouraging. The population density of sub-Saharan Africa is still only 1608 per 1000 hectares of arable land, as compared with 3200 for the industrial countries, and 4191 for the world. Of the 35 sub-Saharan African countries for which information is available, 21 have densities of less than 700 per 1000 hectares, 9 have densities greater than 1600, and only 2 have densities greater than 3200 (Rwanda and Kenya).
According to some studies, relatively high population densities can have positive effects on agricultural development (e.g. Simon, 1981; Boserup, 1981; Pingoli and Binswanger, 1987; Hayami and Ruttan, 1987) . The sources of these effects include, for example, increased efficiency of infrastructure, services and markets, shifts to more productive labour and land-intensive farming technologies, production scale economies and increased domestic demand. But the statistical evidence does not indicate any consistent relationship between densities and agricultural growth (though, exceptionally, the two highest-density countries mentioned above fared significantly better than the average). The root causes of underdeveloped agriculture are many and it is also possible that negative effects may sometimes be wrongly attributed to the population factor (e.g. National Academy of Sciences, 1986) . In the final analysis, circumstances vary, influences are many, and thus there probably is no unique, undifferentiated, static answer to the question of the pure relationship of population growth, size and density to agricultural growth.
However, international policy discussions on African agriculture have made little use of conclusions drawn from the population dynamics of other regions. For example, the Eurasian model, which is better documented than the Latin American, suggests that agricultural output per head is the critical factor explaining the rate of fertility (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987; Lesthaeghe, 1989) , as distinct from contraceptive prevalence and female literacy. In sub-Saharan Africa, relatively high contraceptive prevalence and low female illiteracy have been achieved only by Zimbabwe (40 and 33% respectively). However, they have not produced results in terms of the fertility rate (5-8%) that are commensurate with the performance of Asian countries and Mauritius (2-4%).
The most striking difference vis-a-vis the latter countries seems to be that Zimbabwe, like almost all other sub-Saharan African countries, suffers from a high degree of food insecurity. For example, in low fertility Asian countries the average per capita calorie consumption is about 20% above that of virtually all sub-Saharan African countries, which is itself some 5 to 10% below what is taken as 'requirements', has not increased over the last 25 years, and is now tending to decline even further. No country in the world has so far managed to attain high contraceptive prevalence and low fertility while having an inadequate level of food consumption. It may be then that in the absence of an adequate per capita food supply-whether through increased agricultural productivity and/or through increased food import purchasing power-efforts to extend family planning and related services are not likely to be effective in reducing the fertility rate substantially. (Nevertheless, for developing countries in the lower middle-income category that have attained at least the 'requirement' in calorie consumption, reduction of the fertility rate below 4-5 may well be relatively more dependent on the availability of family planning and health services, female literacy and general education).
We feel, therefore, that the focus of attention so far as the least developed countries are concerned should be on increasing absolute GNP and, in particular, food production/productivity and/or food import purchasing power as fast as possible at the least cost, whatever the rate of growth of population. For example, the achievement of above average rates of growth of per capita GNP by countries like Mali, Lesotho and Burkina Faso was due more to above average rates of growth of absolute GNP than to below average rates of growth of population. This process we believe will be a more effective, and possibly a quicker and cheaper means of substantially reducing the fertility rate. In contrast, concentrating efforts and resources on improvements to health, education and family planning services as the means of reducing the fertility rate from 6-5 to, say, 4-5, without ensuring that the critical levels of per capita income and food consumption are simultaneously attained, as discussed above, may well be self-defeating in some least developed countries, or may take much longer for the objective to be achieved.
Raising absolute GNP growth of the least developed countries by an average of 3-0 percentage points a year would double the per capita income level, could abolish food insecurity, and achieve the fertility reduction target in about two decades. We believe this is a feasible objective, especially given the existing substantial underutilisation of capacity in sub-Saharan Africa, the possibilities for agricultural, primary export and domestic industrial rehabilitation, and an appropriate strategic re-orientation to aid policy. Moreover, the GNP/fertility target may well be attained in a shorter period and at lower investment cost to the extent that an accelerated elimination of food insecurity would itself have a pronounced positive impact on the GNP growth rate (Reutlinger and Pellekaan, 1986; Dasgupta, 1991) .
Reconstruction and structural adjustment
In most of the aid-favoured countries poor economic performance is directly attributable to the decline of the traditional sectors-domestic agriculture, export commodities and domestic manufactures. Certainly, as shown above, the long depression in world prices for commodities, while import prices increased substantially, helped to degrade the statistical relationship between aid and GNP growth.
Within the conflicting assessments of the growth effectiveness of structural adjustment (policy-based) lending there are differences of emphasis on the role of policies based on market forces and the role of government in promoting infrastructure, land tenure, institutional and human resource development, technological capacity and markets for products, risks and information (Lele, 1988) . Nevertheless, the individual country submissions to the Conference on the Least Developed Countries, while recognising the importance of both roles (UNCTAD, 1990) , are impressive from our standpoint in revealing the extent to which aidable production possibilities requiring a minimum of new investment in social, institutional and economic infrastructure, human resource development, risk support and information have been underutilised.
For example, Africa's share of world exports, for all but one of its major export crops, fell during the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1970 and , the world market share of the least developed countries for coffee, cocoa and cotton shrank by 18-8, 62-9 and 45-4% respectively. In manufacturing industries, capacity utilisation in these countries was typically under 30% and not infrequently plant collapsed altogether. The situation was frequently worse in respect of some physical installations. For instance, Mali, a drought-stricken country, reported that the utilisation of hydro-agricultural potential was merely about 16%, while three hydro-electric facilities remained substantially underutilised (Mali, 1990; Courier, 1990) .
These avoidable failures point to feasible possibilities for reconstruction which may be augmented by linked production possibilities that could quickly be realised with a minimum investment of capital, such as those demonstrated by Adelman (1984) , and Adelman and Taylor (1990) in their agricultural demand-led industrialisation strategy of development, by Bagachwa and Stewart (1990) in their work on rural industries and rural linkages, and by Riddell (1990) on the prospects for manufacturing in sub-Saharan Africa. The possibilities for reconstruction are also implicit in the fact that in some countries such as Guinea Bissau and Tanzania, the growth of per capita agricultural production was actually negative over the last two decades. While evidently in most African countries policy-reform was needed, it is not surprising that, with insufficient production-targeted investments, such reform has not been able to achieve the desired resuscitation, let alone new growth, of the productive sectors. Indeed, the World Bank's IFC itself, while acknowledging the contribution of adjustment programmes to the business climate in sub-Saharan Africa, pointed to the acute shortage of capital for productive investments as a 'crucial problem' throughout that region. It reported that in 1990 only seven projects sponsored by its affiliate, the African Project Development Facility, were able to obtain adequate financing (IFC, 1991) .
Greater emphasis on reconstruction raises policy procedural issues for the Bank and the Fund in connection with their structural and sectoral adjustment lending programmes. Although increasingly these institutions have overlapping policies, policy-instruments and time-frames, their operations are still essentially separate. Fund-sponsored structural adjustment programmes usually require aggregate demand (fiscal/monetary) retrenchment to restore macroeconomic balances. Invariably, this entails reducing government expenditure, including in areas that affect maintenance and improvement of existing agricultural and industrial capacity, such as on small-scale irrigation, extension, public utilities, storage and marketing services, credit, employment and income stabilisation.
The Bank's adjustment programmes are ostensibly supportive of microeconomic policy reform intended to enhance supply performance. Such policy-based short-term financial support to African countries reached a level as high as 37% in 1989 (44% in 1986) of the Bank's/IDA's total loans and credits to those countries (World Bank, 1989A) . When lending for economic infrastructure is added, the proportion of loans and credits devoted to supporting policy reform and financing infrastructure rises to 60 to 70%. By contrast, only 19% of the loans and credits made available to these countries were allocated to agricultural and rural development projects and 2% to industrial projects.
1
A sharper focus on reconstruction might be encouraged by several means. Predetermined limits to policy-based lending could be introduced. Prior and more comprehensive co-ordination of Bank/Fund operations might help to improve mutual understanding between these institutions of problems and possibilities and to bring about greater concurrence in their activities. Early and more intensive involvement of recipient governments in policy framework consultations might also be helpful. Targeting specific activities for increased production/productivity might be introduced, perhaps within the Bank's sectoral adjustment lending operations and linked to expanded IMF compensatory financing for shortfalls in commodity prices and earnings. At the same time, less productive, admittedly high risk conditions, such as across-the-board import liberalisation, that are financed by policy-based lending, might need to be relaxed. These initial moves might be useful in paving the way for an eventual return to long-term indicative development programmes, within which Bank/Fund lending might be fully integrated.
Rationalising aid for social, institutional and human development and technical assistance
Social, institutional and human resource development is already absorbing 35% of aid. And the conventional wisdom is now stressing an even higher percentage of aid for this category. Technical assistance alone (often of more benefit to the experts of developed countries than to the aid-recipient countries themselves) is now accounting additionally for as much as 20% of aid. In some individual countries the percentage is considerably higher. For example, 60% of The Netherlands' and United States' aid to Mali was in the form of technical assistance-when, for want of relatively modest investments in intermediate inputs and equipment, production in many industries was rapidly declining 1 Of the 37 sub-Saharan African countries that borrowed from the World Bank Group during fiscal years 1988-90, 26 were numbered among the African least developed countries. (Mali, 1990) . Bangladesh, the biggest least developed country, made the point cogently in its report to the United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries:
There is a growing scepticism regarding the usefulness of technical assistance projects. Policymakers have perceived that there is already an overdose of technical assistance, and insistence by the donors for technical assistance projects is seen as a conditionality criterion. These perceptions are based on the belief that there is a lack of balance between technical assistance projectB and investment projects. (Bangladesh, 1990) Controversial and unfashionable as a proposal to rationalise aid for the above-mentioned purposes may seem, it could be a way out of the present dilemma. Well-conceived cost-effective forms of aid for human resource development is obviously thoroughly desirable, but there is a widespread feeling that much aid categorised as social, institutional, human development and technical assistance is useless. Some rationalisation, therefore, could permit released resources to be diverted to areas of greater productivity in terms of their short-run effect on the growth of GNP and savings, and thereby help to create a capacity for self-sustainable growth and the reduction of poverty. Regrettably, the persistent and widespread pattern of negative savings growth, even among aid-favoured developing countries, in addition to resistance on the part of developed countries to increase aid substantially and the unlikelihood of large inflows of foreign investment in the near future, do not inspire confidence in current policies as a basis for a viable solution to the problem of 'least development'.
The changes proposed above would require a short-to-medium term strategic reorientation to the structure of aid, as distinct from an increase and improved 'quality'. Since the greater proportion of aid comes from bilateral sources, these changes would also require greater predictability and more effective co-ordination mechanisms among the donors. Helpful in this connection would be improvements to the (individual country) aid reviews conducted by the OECD/DAC-for example, more in-depth study of individual countries, including more detailed break-down of the uses of aid, an independent examiner system, involvement of recipient interests in the reviews, the collation of aid projects and programmes across donor countries, and assessment of their effects. On the part of developing countries, they would require, for a start, adjustment to development time-horizons and more highly focused sectoral production targets within longer-term national development plans. Understandably, these countries wish all needs to be adequately, quickly and simultaneously addressed. This, however, is simply not proving to be a realistic expectation.
Concluding remarks
The studies available, econometric or otherwise, regrettably have not improved the certainty of our knowledge about the aid-GNP relationship. There is, however, enough evidence to conclude that adverse terms of trade, poor returns on investment and low labour productivity account to a great extent for the apparent GNP-ineffectiveness of aid. Nevertheless, there seems to be a broader based concern that aid is not contributing as much as is desirable to the growth of income and savings among the least developed countries of the world.
We suggest a short-to-medium-term strategic re-orientation to the structure of aid, with the focus placed on increasing GNP growth and eliminating food insecurity, through the reconstruction of traditional agricultural, export and domestic manufacturing sectors. At the same time, we expect this to make a critical contribution to reducing population growth. Such a strategy would entail rationalising aid in some non-directly productive categories, ensuring greater stability in aid flows and improving donor co-ordination mechanisms. It would call for reforms to Bank/Fund policy-lending procedures which would, furthermore, open the way for increased project lending within the framework of more integrated long-term indicative development programmes.
This approach contrasts with the current preoccupation of the international community with aid 'quality 1 , enhanced social, institutional and human resource development and technical assistance. The authors feel that these elements, well-intentioned though they may be, have not exerted in the past and are not likely to exert in the future a sufficiently strong pull to enable the least developed countries to escape, within a tolerable time-horizon, the 'gravity' of low income and negative savings in which they are presently entrapped, especially in a situation where there is general agreement that adequate increases in aid and inflows of foreign investment to these countries are unlikely to materialise.
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deflator whilst ODA, total financial flows, foreign direct investment, exports and imports were deflated by the export price index of manufactured goods exported by developed countries 1980=1. Variables in national currencies-GNP, savings, domestic investment, exports, imports and consumption-were then converted to US dollars using the 1980 exchange rate. (ODA, total financial flows and foreign direct investment were already in US dollars.)
Computation of annual average growth rates
Variables in national currencies were not converted into US dollars before computing the exponential growth rates. Rather, all variables in current prices were converted into constant prices using the appropriate deflators as described above. The mean annual rates of growth have been computed by using the least squares method. The least-squares growth rate, r, is estimated by fitting a least-squares linear trend line to the logarithmic annual values of the variable in the relevant period.
In X, = In X o + (r) . ln(l + r) (A.2)
More specifically, the regression equation takes the form of In X, = a + bt + «" where this is equivalent to the logarithmic transformation of the compound growth rate equation given in (A. 1).
In equation (A.3), X is the variable, t is time, and a -In X o and b = ln(l + r) are the parameters to be estimated, e is the error term. If b* is the least-squares estimate of b, then the annual average growth rate, r, is obtained as:
The use of the least-squares method on all the annual data in the relevant period makes the resulting growth rates better indicators of general trends, and hence more robust than the mean (exponential) growth rate method used by Moschos (1989) , Grier and Tullock (1989) , and Kormendi and Mequire (1985) .
Estimation of equations
Estimation of the individual country equations has been done by expressing all variables in terms of rates of change between successive years, since the growth rate method described above only provides scalar values for cross-sectional analysis. The simple percentage change in the variables has been used in this study to represent growth rates for the time-series country analysis, although the difference of the natural logarithms of variables is approximately equal to the percentage change in the variables. Thus, The result from (A.6) is multiplied by 100 to arrive at the percentage growth rate for the time-series country analysis. It should be noted that first differences are used extensively to remove common trends in the variables, and also to linearise the system approximately. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique in Statistical Analysis System (SAS) was employed to estimate the equation to yield consistent and unbiased estimates. In general, autocorrelation was not a problem in the time-series country analysis, and sampling errors were small, thus dismissing concern about multicollinearity.
Aid effectiveness over time
Although aid was found to be of limited GNP-effectiveness, within those bounds an attempt was made to determine the structure of its impact over time. A separate equation was therefore run with the real values of the variables and a lag structure of ODA derived from gestation periods of World Bank-financed projects. The results were similar to those of Mosley a al. (1987) in the sense that the effectiveness of aid was high in the first four years and tapered off thereafter.
Economically active population
Economically active population is defined to include all persons of either sex who furnish the labour supply available for the production of economic goods and services and who are employed or unemployed at the time of a census survey. The economically active population in principle does not include students, women occupied solely in domestic duties, retired persons, persons living entirely on their own means, and persons wholly dependent on others. In Burkina Faso, the economically active population figures do not include unemployed. In Cape Verde, the economically active population figures exclude unpaid family workers. In Mozambique, the economically active population figures exclude persons on compulsory military service. In fact, national practices vary between countries as regards the treatment of members of the armed forces, inmates ofinstitutions, nomads, persons living in disputed areas or in other special areas such as reservations, seasonal workers, persons engaged in part-time work, students who also work, and persons seeking their first job. Data, presumed to be estimates, are obtainable from the International Labour Organization sources. 
